LAW MARKS: Mark Johnson's occasional--and occasionally irreverent--review of recent developments in family law and civil procedure. For May 2003, topics include child support for a non-dependent child, a posthumous QDRO, the retention of an engagement ring after the wedding is cancelled, and the length of a year.
The Court of Appeals, in Compton v. Compton, decided on April 3, held enforceable an agreement between grandparents to provide support for their granddaughter, who was also their legal ward. An agreement is illegal, the court held, if it is contrary to law, morality, or public policy. "We perceive nothing immoral about a private agreement between two non-parent guardians to assume and allocate the cost of supporting a protected person."
Compton may have implications for some third-party parentage cases. Those cases do not ordinarily involve a support obligation, but such an obligation could be created by agreement.
The court also decided on April 24 that "one year" in a statute of limitations meant one calendar year, whether or not it was a leap year. The case was Neff v. Jackson County. The court disapproved language to the contrary in a 1990 case, Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Glenn.
Some family law practitioners are familiar with the malpractice trap known as a "pre-retirement survivor's benefit." The benefit is a common feature of retirement plans and is paid to a surviving spouse (or ex-spouse) when the wage earner dies before retirement. They are frequently overlooked in the drafting of orders to divide the plans.
On April 23, the Third Circuit court of appeals decided in a pre-retirement survivor benefit case that an order entered after the wage earner's death was in fact a qualified order and ordered that it be enforced. The opinion in Patton v. Denver Post Corp rejects the contrary Third Circuit authority of Samroo v. Samroo.
The Texas Court of Appeals has decided an interesting little case about what happens to the engagement ring when the wedding is called off. Michael Curtis gave the ring to Michele Anderson, contingent, he said, upon her oral promise to marry him. When Curtis broke off the engagement, he also sought the return of the ring.
The Texas court demurred. The Statute of Frauds, the court held, required any agreement made in contemplation of marriage to be in writing. (Oregon's Statute of Frauds has a similar provision at ORS 41.580(1)(d). Moreover, it was Curtis, not Anderson, who broke off the engagement--he, not Anderson, who breached the promise to marry. In these circumstances, the court held, Anderson was entitled to keep the ring as a gift. The case is Curtis v. Anderson, decided on April 10.
Mark Johnson is an appeals attorney practicing in Portland, Oregon. He also provides attorney coaching, consulting, and collaboration on a wide range of family law issues.
Please share this newsletter with your colleagues. If you want to receive your own e-mailed copy of the newsletter in the future, please contact me and we'll add your name to the distribution list.
Mark Johnson is an appeals attorney practicing in Portland, Oregon. He also provides attorney coaching, consulting, and collaboration on a wide range of family law issues. Mark is available to act as a reference judge in Oregon family law cases.
Please share this newsletter with your colleagues. If you want to receive your own e-mailed copy of the newsletter in the future, please contact me and we will add your name to the distribution list.
Johnson & Lechman-Su PC, 1200 Weatherly Building, 516 SE Morrison Street, Portland, Oregon 97214
Home | About Us | Family Law | News | Contact Us | Directions/Parking | Site Map